What Happened?

Before we begin, I want to make one thing clear: this article is not an endorsement of Xiaohongshu. I also believe Xiaohongshu should first be required to comply with Taiwan’s laws.

Other social-media services have to comply with the law; Xiaohongshu should not be the sole exception.

At the same time, we should remember that government rules and actions are not always designed to infringe your rights. Sometimes they are meant to protect you.

But because the issue prompted discussion on social media, this article asks whether the government’s measure was appropriate.

What Is Xiaohongshu?

Xiaohongshu is a popular Chinese social-commerce application. Founded in 2013 by Mao Wenchao and Qu Fang, it began as a platform for sharing overseas shopping experiences and travel tips.[1]

Its core identity is a “lifestyle-sharing community.” Users publish image- and short-video-based “notes” about beauty, fashion, food, travel, home life, exercise, and other interests.

One of the platform’s defining features is its “seeding” culture: users share or recommend products in ways that inspire others to buy. Recommendations framed as authentic personal experience can strongly shape consumer demand.

According to information cited by Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior, Criminal Investigation Bureau, and national-security authorities, Xiaohongshu had more than three million users in Taiwan, with especially active communities around beauty, travel, and lifestyle content.[2]

For those users, Xiaohongshu is more than an app. It is a digital home where they exchange beauty tips, travel itineraries, workout updates, and connections with people who share their interests. Restricting the service cuts off the channel through which that community exchanges everyday ideas.

The Restriction on Xiaohongshu

On December 3, 2025, the government released cybersecurity test results for five mobile applications—TikTok, Xiaohongshu, Weibo, WeChat, and Baidu Netdisk. The results identified common risks involving the collection of sensitive information, access to storage, and the transmission and sharing of data.[3]

The following day, December 4, the Ministry of the Interior announced an interim measure directed at Xiaohongshu. It said an earlier National Security Bureau cybersecurity test had found the service failed all 15 indicators. From 2024 through the date of the press release, Xiaohongshu had also been implicated in 1,706 fraud cases causing more than NT$247.68 million in property losses. Because the operator did not cooperate with lawful requests for necessary information, investigators and victims seeking compensation faced additional difficulties.[18]

The Ministry also said Xiaohongshu had not established a legal representative in Taiwan capable of fulfilling obligations under Taiwanese law. The government had asked the platform’s parent company, through the Straits Exchange Foundation, to propose improvements, but had received no response when the measure was announced.[18]

The Ministry therefore invoked Article 42 of the Fraud Crime Hazard Prevention Act and issued an order suspending internet resolution of or restricting access to Xiaohongshu for a provisional one-year period. It said later action would depend on whether the operator responded, complied with the law, and reduced digital-safety risks.[18]

The measure restricts users in Taiwan from accessing Xiaohongshu. Whether it is necessary, whether it is too broad, and how it affects the freedom to speak and receive information are the constitutional questions considered below.

Restricting Xiaohongshu May Limit Freedom of Expression

How Did This Discussion Begin?

I began thinking about the issue after seeing a social-media discussion about whether this kind of government action could be challenged through constitutional review.

A government order suspending resolution or restricting access may first constitute a concrete, case-specific administrative disposition.

Constitutional review therefore will not usually be the first avenue of relief. The addressee of the disposition would normally begin with an administrative appeal and administrative litigation.

If the administrative courts ultimately uphold the disposition and the affected party still seeks relief, a path to constitutional review may then become available.

The Xiaohongshu situation is particularly difficult for individual users. They are not necessarily the formal addressees of the disposition; they may merely be people affected by it and may lack standing. A major creator or merchant who has operated on the platform for a long time might have a stronger possibility of pursuing relief.

Whether a claimant could prevail in administrative litigation or would ultimately need constitutional review cannot be predicted with certainty. Nothing here is absolute.

Those first-line remedies are not the main subject of this article. I mention them only as a modest response to the concern I saw online.

Before going further, I also want to stress that this discussion neither endorses nor condemns the content or geopolitical position of Xiaohongshu itself. Nor does it deny that the government may be acting from legitimate concerns about cybersecurity and fraud prevention.

Fraud rings really are infuriating, and I strongly believe Xiaohongshu should comply with the law first. Only then do we turn to whether the government’s own conduct raises constitutional concerns.

The narrower question is whether, when addressing an online controversy, the state may use the highly restrictive method of “prior restraint” to bypass due process and directly deprive people of fundamental rights.

Expression on Social-Media Platforms Is Protected by Article 11 of the Constitution

What we ordinarily call freedom of speech is one part of the broader freedom of expression protected by Article 11 of the Constitution.

Article 11 of the Constitution: The people shall have freedom of speech, teaching, writing and publication.

Freedom of expression means communicating thoughts, ideas, or opinions through speech, conduct, or other expressive methods.

Freedom of speech overlaps with the freedoms of teaching, writing, and publication. Expression that does not fit neatly into written works conveyed through text, images, video, sound, dance, drama, or computer programs; printed publication; or teaching in schools and cultural institutions can still fall within the sphere of speech.

Other constitutional provisions protect additional forms of expression, but they are outside this article’s scope.

In today’s highly digital society, human connection is no longer limited to face-to-face interaction. It includes publishing, sharing, and commenting on social-media posts.

Whether these activities receive constitutional protection still calls for a more careful explanation.

J.Y. Interpretation No. 364 offers an early starting point. It held that expressing opinions through radio and television falls within the freedom of speech protected by Article 11. Even then, constitutional protection extended to emerging communications media with broad influence.[7]

TCC Judgment 112-Hsien-Pan-8 (2023) provides another example.[8] Several underlying cases involved statements made in Facebook posts and Stories.

The judgment’s central subject was the criminalization of defamation and the balance between freedom of speech and reputation, not a categorical ruling on every kind of social-media content. A more precise statement is that the Court has analyzed specific social-media expression under Article 11 and the principle of proportionality. That makes the judgment a concrete example of social-media expression entering constitutional protection and rights balancing.

Sharing travel, beauty, lifestyle experiences, or views on public affairs through a social platform may therefore be constitutionally protected expression. The level of protection still depends on the content and context and on any conflict with the rights of others or the public interest.

Some scholars also regard large social-network platforms as de facto “public forums”: spaces for public discussion in a democratic society that may not be readily replaceable.[9][10]

That view further highlights the public and civic value of user expression on social media.

Although the issue is somewhat different, Florida Senate Bill 7072 also provides indirect support. The dispute there concerned whether government may limit a large platform’s power to moderate its own users’ speech.[11]

If user speech on major social platforms had no relationship to freedom of expression, government regulation of that moderation would not rise to a constitutional question.

Both case law and scholarship therefore suggest that, as communications technology develops, user expression on social media falls within the domain of freedom of expression.

Restricting Xiaohongshu Raises Concerns Analogous to Prior Restraint

Prior restraint occurs when the government reviews, prohibits, or regulates information or speech before it is disseminated.

By contrast, subsequent punishment acts after expression occurs and addresses concrete harm already caused, seeking to balance expression with other rights or interests such as reputation and public order.

In recent years, much of the Constitutional Court’s freedom-of-expression review has involved subsequent punishment. TCC Judgment 112-Hsien-Pan-8 (2023), for example, reviewed speech that had already been made.

Prior restraint can cause greater harm than later punishment. Taiwan’s constitutional case law has applied different standards depending on the type of restriction.

J.Y. Interpretation No. 414 addressed a rule requiring approval before drug advertisements could be broadcast or published. The majority treated drug advertising as commercial speech closely related to public health and held that the preapproval rule then at issue did not violate Articles 11 or 23 of the Constitution.[12]

J.Y. Interpretation No. 644 addressed a rule allowing authorities to deny the formation of a civic association because it advocated communism or division of the national territory. The Interpretation held that this content-based prior control exceeded what was necessary and violated freedom of association.[13]

In J.Y. Interpretation No. 744, the Justices considered a rule requiring official approval before cosmetic advertisements could be broadcast or published. They described this kind of prior review as a serious interference with freedom of speech. In principle, it should not be used unless it is designed to prevent direct, immediate, and irreparable harm and is accompanied by strict procedural safeguards, including prompt judicial relief.[14]

Together, these Interpretations show that constitutionality cannot be decided simply by observing that regulation occurs before speech. The analysis must also consider the type of speech, the interest protected, the breadth of the restriction, whether the harm is direct and urgent, whether less restrictive alternatives exist, and whether effective remedies are available.

Suspending resolution of or restricting access to Xiaohongshu is not identical to the schemes in Interpretations Nos. 414 and 744, which required individual content to be submitted for approval before publication. Its effect, however, is to block, for the duration of the measure, the entire channel for future speech, creative work, information exchange, and receipt of information on the platform.

This article therefore argues that a platform-wide access restriction raises constitutional concerns closely analogous to prior restraint. Existing doctrine can help test whether the government interest is sufficiently important, whether the measure’s scope and duration are necessary, whether less restrictive alternatives exist, and whether adequate procedural and remedial safeguards are available.

But the boundary must be clear: this is the article’s analogical application of existing constitutional doctrine and its own legal assessment. As of September 3, 2026, the Constitutional Court had not ruled on this specific Xiaohongshu measure. Nor had it held that every measure of this kind necessarily constitutes the prior review discussed in Interpretation No. 744 or must receive exactly the same standard of review.

The measure’s constitutionality would still have to be determined from its legal basis, the cybersecurity and fraud risks identified by the government, its scope and duration, possible alternatives, and the availability of effective relief.

Why Could the Constitutional Court Barely Function When This Article Was Published?

The analysis above suggests that restricting Xiaohongshu may implicate freedom of expression. But a binding determination that a statute or final court decision is unconstitutional must ultimately proceed through the constitutional-litigation system and be decided by the Constitutional Court.

This article was originally written on December 5, 2025. The difficulty then was that Article 30, Paragraph 2 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act, as promulgated on January 23, 2025, required at least ten Justices to participate in deliberation and at least nine to agree before declaring a provision unconstitutional. After seven Justices completed their terms on October 31, 2024 and their successors had not been confirmed, only eight Justices remained. For an extended period, the Court therefore could not issue merits judgments under the new threshold.[15][16][17]

That is why the original article said the Constitutional Court “could not function.” The statement described the institutional situation on December 5, 2025; it does not describe the present.

On December 19, 2025, the Court issued TCC Judgment 114-Hsien-Pan-1 (2025). It held that Article 30, Paragraphs 2 through 6 and related provisions of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act promulgated on January 23 had been enacted through a legislative process with clear and gross flaws, violating constitutional due process of lawmaking and the separation of powers. The provisions ceased to have effect from the announcement of the judgment.[19]

The Court subsequently resumed issuing judgments. As of September 3, 2026, its official list recorded TCC Judgments 115-Hsien-Pan-1 through 115-Hsien-Pan-6 (2026), so it is no longer accurate to describe the Court in the present tense as wholly unable to issue judgments.[20]

The Court’s return does not mean that an ordinary user may skip existing remedies and immediately ask the Court to decide whether the Xiaohongshu measure is unconstitutional. Access to the Constitutional Court still depends on satisfying the statutory requirements for the relevant type of petition.

The Referendum Petition Proposed at the Time—and What Happened Next

When this article was published on December 5, 2025, the electronic petition for national referendum No. 9001 was under way. It sought to repeal Article 30, Paragraph 2 of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act and remove the thresholds requiring at least ten Justices to deliberate and at least nine votes to declare unconstitutionality. At the time, this was one civic route for responding to the Court’s paralysis.

The original petition page is retained as a historical record:

National Referendum No. 9001 Electronic Petition Page (petition period closed)

Electronic petition page for national referendum No. 9001
Electronic petition page for referendum No. 9001; the petition period has closed

Later institutional developments overtook the original call to action. On December 19, 2025, TCC Judgment 114-Hsien-Pan-1 (2025) invalidated Article 30, Paragraphs 2 through 6 and related provisions. The petition page for No. 9001 now also states that the petition period has closed. This section is therefore no longer a petition readers can act on today; it remains as a record of the institutional background and civic action at the time.[19][21]

One further point matters. Even if a referendum were completed or the thresholds removed, the Court would not automatically review the Xiaohongshu access restriction. A person disputing a specific administrative measure would ordinarily still have to pursue the relevant administrative remedies and litigation. A constitutional complaint against a final court decision generally also requires an adverse final decision, exhaustion of ordinary appeals, and compliance with Article 59 and other provisions of the Constitutional Court Procedure Act.[22]

How Do You Apply for and Use a Citizen Digital Certificate Today?

Although the electronic petition for No. 9001 has closed, the Citizen Digital Certificate remains useful for many online government services. This section no longer presents it as a how-to guide for joining that petition. Instead, it retains general application and use instructions under current rules. Eligibility, fees, and software interfaces may change again, so check the latest announcement from the Ministry of the Interior Certificate Authority before applying.

What Is a Citizen Digital Certificate?

A Citizen Digital Certificate is an IC card issued by the Ministry of the Interior. Similar in appearance to a National Health Insurance card or bank card, it contains a personal digital certificate that verifies the holder’s identity online—a “digital key” for government services.

A Citizen Digital Certificate card
What a Citizen Digital Certificate card looks like

Depending on the rules of each service, the certificate can be used to file taxes online, access tax information, and request household-registration or land-registration transcripts. Whether a particular service is supported depends on the latest information from that service.

How Do I Apply?

Under current rules published by the Ministry of the Interior Certificate Authority, an applicant must be at least 18 years old, have household registration in Taiwan, and not be under an order of guardianship. Applications must be made in person; a legal representative or another person cannot apply on the applicant’s behalf.[23][24]

Bring the original National Identification Card and prepare a working email address, mobile-phone number, and the NT$250 card-production fee. Apply at a Household Registration Office that accepts Citizen Digital Certificate applications. The service is not tied to the applicant’s registered place of residence, but it is still wise to confirm office hours and payment methods before visiting.[23][24]

After identity and application details are verified at the counter, official guidance estimates that card production takes about five to ten minutes, excluding time spent waiting.[24]

How Do I Use It?

A desktop or laptop computer will generally need a card reader capable of reading the certificate’s IC chip. The E-books T29 reader used in the original article was only the author’s personal equipment, not the sole option or an officially designated model. Confirm that any reader is compatible with your operating system, ports, and smart-card specifications.

The card reader used by the author when the original article was written
The author’s card reader at the time of writing; the model is only a personal-equipment example

Before using the card, follow the latest instructions from the Ministry of the Interior Certificate Authority and install the cross-platform web component. Do not rely on the legacy HiCOS download page cited in the original article as a permanent entry point.[25]

Ministry of the Interior Certificate Authority: Cross-Platform Web Component Download

For Citizen Digital Certificates issued on or after September 23, 2025, the default PIN is eight digits: the last four digits of the holder’s National Identification Card number followed by the four-digit month and day of birth. It is not a password printed on the card. For security, change the PIN after first use by following the official instructions, and keep it secure.[24]

Illustration of the legacy Citizen Digital Certificate interface
Legacy interface shown for illustration; follow the current cross-platform web component in actual use

After installing the component, connect the reader, insert the certificate, and follow the instructions on the government-service page you wish to use. Because the petition for No. 9001 has closed, this article no longer says in the present tense that completing the form will finish that petition.

Conclusion

In a modern democracy, freedom of expression is not an abstract slogan. It is a right every citizen must continue to understand and protect. At the same time, restrictions on rights are not necessarily imposed simply to violate them; they may seek to protect cybersecurity, property, or other public interests.

Posts, Stories, and videos on social media may all fall within the freedom of expression protected by Article 11. But that protection is not unlimited. When expression conflicts with the rights of others, fraud prevention, information security, or national security, we must still ask whether the government has adequate legal authority, whether the measure is necessary or excessive, and whether affected people can obtain effective relief.

Against the background of a Constitutional Court that had been unable to issue merits judgments for an extended period, the original article said on December 5, 2025:

Do not just stand by. Apply for a Citizen Digital Certificate, refuse to let freedom fall silent, and help the Constitutional Court function again!

That sentence records the civic appeal of its moment. Petition No. 9001 later closed, and the Court resumed issuing judgments after TCC Judgment 114-Hsien-Pan-1 (2025). A more precise conclusion today is this: the institutional landscape has changed, but neither side can simply declare the Xiaohongshu restriction constitutional or unconstitutional. The competent authority must examine the law, the facts, and proportionality in a concrete case.

Xiaohongshu itself still faces disputes over cybersecurity, fraud risk, and its obligation to comply with Taiwanese law. Pointing out that a government measure may implicate freedom of expression does not excuse the platform from legal duties. What must be protected is the rule that, whoever the target may be, the state must give adequate reasons, follow due process, and remain subject to judicial review when it restricts fundamental rights.

I’m Wakame. Follow my Facebook page and Instagram if you enjoy my work, and you will not miss the next article!

References

[1] Sina Technology. (2024, March 25). Company profile of Xiaohongshu: Founded by Mao Wenchao and Qu Fang in 2013 [in Chinese]. Retrieved from https://finance.sina.com.cn/tech/roll/2024-03-25/doc-inappxsp7462133.shtml

[2] NOWnews. (2025, December 4). Xiaohongshu restriction explainer: When does it begin, when will it end, what happens if the app is not deleted, and what three million users should know [in Chinese]. https://www.nownews.com/news/6761557

[3] Central News Agency. (2025, December 3). Ministry of Digital Affairs identifies high-risk apps; Xiaohongshu fails all 15 cybersecurity indicators [in Chinese]. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/ahel/202512030203.aspx

[4] TVBS News. (2025, December 4). Xiaohongshu restriction explainer: Why was it restricted, what happens if it is not deleted, and how three million users are affected [in Chinese]. https://news.tvbs.com.tw/life/3063328

[5] SET News. (2025, December 5). Understanding the Xiaohongshu restriction: Why was it imposed, is there a fine for not deleting the app, and what is the impact on three million users? [in Chinese]. https://www.setn.com/News.aspx?NewsID=1761054

[6] Yahoo Taiwan News (republishing SET News). (2025, December 4). Understanding the Xiaohongshu restriction: Why was it imposed, is there a fine for not deleting the app, and what is the impact on three million users? [in Chinese]. https://tw.news.yahoo.com/%E5%B0%8F%E7%B4%85%E6%9B%B8%E5%B0%81%E9%8E%96-%E6%96%87%E7%9C%8B%E6%87%82-%E7%82%BA%E4%BD%95%E8%A2%AB%E7%A6%81-%E6%B2%92%E5%88%AA%E9%99%A4%E6%9C%83%E9%96%8B%E7%BD%B0%E5%97%8E-300%E8%90%AC%E7%94%A8%E6%88%B6%E5%BD%B1%E9%9F%BF%E7%A7%92%E6%87%82-225400268.html

[7] Judicial Yuan. (1994, September 23). J.Y. Interpretation No. 364: Expressing opinions through radio and television falls within the freedom of speech protected by Article 11 of the Constitution.

[8] Taiwan Constitutional Court. (2023, June 9). TCC Judgment 112-Hsien-Pan-8 (2023): Case on the Criminalization of Defamation II.

[9] Hsu, Ping-Hua. (2023). Social media and freedom of speech—state action, public forums, and government speech [in Chinese]. Taiwan Technology Law Review, (6), 61–125.

[10] Yang, Shao-Kai. (2020). A freedom-of-speech analysis of regulating disinformation on social media (Unpublished master’s thesis) [in Chinese]. National Taiwan University.

[11] Hsu, Yu-Tien, & Lee, Chi-Heng. (2023). The constitutionality of government regulation of speech moderation by large social-network platforms: Florida Senate Bill 7072 [in Chinese]. National Chung Cheng University Law Journal, (80), 1–55.

[12] Judicial Yuan. (1996, November 8). J.Y. Interpretation No. 414: Preapproval of drug advertising and the public interest in protecting health. https://cons.judicial.gov.tw/docdata.aspx?fid=100&id=310595

[13] Judicial Yuan. (2008, June 20). J.Y. Interpretation No. 644: Content-based denial of civic-association formation and freedom of association. https://cons.judicial.gov.tw/docdata.aspx?fid=100&id=310825

[14] Judicial Yuan. (2017, January 6). J.Y. Interpretation No. 744: Prior review of cosmetic advertising and freedom of commercial speech.

[15] Judicial Reform Foundation. (2025, July 25). Statement: Regret that the Constitutional Court remains idle at the cost of people’s rights [in Chinese]. https://www.civilmedia.tw/archives/134179

[16] Judicial Reform Foundation. (2025, March 6). Statement: Defuse the constitutional time bomb—calling on the Constitutional Court to suspend application of the newly amended CCPA provisions [in Chinese]. https://www.jrf.org.tw/articles/2915

[17] Taiwan Forever Association. (2025, September 2). Statement: The Constitutional Court has been paralyzed for 222 days; constitutional order must return to normal as soon as possible [in Chinese]. https://www.taiwanforever.org.tw/2025/09/222.html

[18] Ministry of the Interior. (2025, December 4). Ministry protects the public’s information security and imposes interim measures on a high-fraud-risk app [in Chinese]. https://www.moi.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=4&s=334958

[19] Taiwan Constitutional Court. (2025, December 19). TCC Judgment 114-Hsien-Pan-1 (2025): Case on the Amendment to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act. https://cons.judicial.gov.tw/docdata.aspx?fid=77&id=358011

[20] Taiwan Constitutional Court. (2026). Judgments. https://cons.judicial.gov.tw/judcurrentNew1.aspx?fid=38

[21] Central Election Commission. (n.d.). National Referendum Electronic Petition System: No. 9001 [in Chinese]. https://referendum.cec.gov.tw/depose/9001

[22] Laws & Regulations Database of the Republic of China (Taiwan). (current). Constitutional Court Procedure Act, Article 59. https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0030159

[23] Ministry of the Interior Certificate Authority. (current). Registration Authority Counter [in Chinese]. https://moica.nat.gov.tw/rac.html

[24] Ministry of the Interior Certificate Authority. (current). Top 10 Frequently Asked Questions. https://moica.nat.gov.tw/en/tenMajorFaq.html

[25] Ministry of the Interior Certificate Authority. (current). Cross-Platform Web Component Download [in Chinese]. https://moica.nat.gov.tw/rac_plugin.html